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1 Introduction
There is a widespread consensus that occupational segmentation is the chief determinant for gender
differences in wages in the Brazilian labor market (see, e.g., Oliveira, 2001). Although women
correspond to 39% of the formal workers in Brazil, they amount to only 23% of the employees in
the sectors paying relative higher wages in 2004. As well, segmentation increases if one restricts
attention to managerial positions in that women hold only 14% of the latter. This suggests that
there may exist limited promotion prospects for women in the Brazilian job market to the extent
that they may face barriers to rise to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining data from the largest firms of the Brazilian
manufacturing industry. In particular, our goal is to verify whether there indeed exists obstacles
to women’s ascension by checking whether gender matters in how much time it takes to get a
promotion to a managerial position. The aim is to complement the literature on gender differences
in promotions, whose papers mainly focus on computing the promotion rates. Time to promotion
offers a different angle in that samples with a large time span could well present similar likelihoods
of promotion for both genders even if the promotion durations are very different. We construct the
duration variable by following from January 1996 to December 2005 every individual that enters
the RAIS database between January 1991 and December 1995. We denote by nonpromoted the
individuals that do not obtain a promotion to a managerial position within the sample (i.e., the
right-censored observations), whereas we assign duration zero to the workers that already are in
managerial positions in January 1996. Accordingly, we label as promoted the individuals that rise
to a managerial position within our sample (i.e., those with uncensored positive durations).
As far as we know, this is the first study to examine gender differences in promotions using
micro-data from a developing country. Apart from the obvious interest in verifying whether the
main stylized facts hold in a Latin American country, the motivation also lies on the quality and
availability of the Brazilian data. In contrast to the many studies that employ data from individual
firms (see, e.g., Cabral, Ferber and Green, 1981; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1989; Baker, Gibbs and
Holmstrom, 1994), we rely on a homogeneous sample of recently hired workers from the Brazilian
manufacturing industry in the period running from 1996 to 2005. Our data set is particularly
convenient. First, the data include a wide array of controls for worker and firm characteristics.
Second, as opposed to Blau and deVaro (2007), we observe multiple workers per establishment at
different occupations and hierarchical levels as well as their career paths in terms of occupation and
wage. A potential limitation is that our data set does not include any direct measure of on-the-job
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productivity and hence we must come up with indirect controls.
Interestingly, we find that there are significantly less gender differences in the time to promotion
within foreign-owned firms than within domestic firms in the Brazilian manufacturing industry. Our
findings complements to some extent the literature on the differences between multinationals and
domestic firms (Doms and Jensen, 2006; Greene, Hornstein, White and Yeung, 2009) as well as
the evidence that gender differences may depend on the nature of the firm.1 We argue that such
gender differences are consistent with statistical discrimination and self-selection. We reason as
follows. Suppose that there are relatively more women than men who prefer to dedicate more time
to their family than to their careers. Berk (2001) shows that gender differences in average career
concern do not ensure statistical discrimination against the group with lower average career concern
if employees optimally choose which jobs to apply for. The idea is that a career-concerned woman
who applies for a job in a firm with a preference for dedicated employees only does so because she
rationally believes that her odds of being hired compensate the effort to go through the application
process. This means that her qualifications for the job have to be sufficiently good to stand a
chance despite the discrimination. To complete the argument, we rely on two anecdotal evidence
concerning the impact of multinationals in the Brazilian labor market (OECD, 2008). The first is
that domestic firms in Brazil offer a more flexible package in terms of working hours and business
trips than multinationals. This makes them more appealing to less career-concerned individuals
(regardless of their gender). The second is that multinationals compete more fiercely for highly
skilled workers. Under these circumstances, career-concerned women prefer jobs in multinationals
and so statistical discrimination will become more prominent within domestic firms.
We find some indirect evidence supporting the above explanation. On the one hand, male
workers tend to officially work similar hours in foreign-owned and domestic firms regardless of
whether they have been promoted or not. Figure 1 reveals that the main difference is due to the
concentration of the distribution: at least 75% of the male employees of domestic firms work exactly
44 hours per week, whereas there is a bit more of variation in multinationals, with 75% of the male
employees working from 40 to 44 hours per week. It also documents some minor differences in the
lower support of the distribution. In particular, the minimum number of hours worked by promoted
male workers are slightly higher than by nonpromoted male workers. The same applies to female
workers. This is consistent with the the fact that promoted workers are more likely to be of the
1 In this paper, we employ multinational and foreign-owned firm interchangeably even if, in recent years, we have
been witnessing the rise of many Brazilian multinationals, such as Vale (mining and metals), Petrobras (oil and gas),
Gerdau (steel), and EMBRAER (aviation). See Amann (2009) for a historical perspective and a number of case
studies.
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career-concerned type. On the other hand, nonpromoted female employees work relatively much
less only in domestic firms (10 to 44 hours). This is in line with domestic firms offering more flexible
packages. In addition, women in multinationals work much more than females in domestic firms
and than male workers in general. This is well in line with self-selection. As the latter alleviates the
impact of statistical discrimination, we fail to observe as much gender difference in foreign-owned
companies as in domestic firms.
Figure 1: Box plot for working hours per week
This paper mainly relates to the literature on gender differences in career mobility. The theoreti-
cal literature on career mobility mainly focus on schooling (Sicherman and Galor, 1990), abstracting
away from gender differences. There are a few exceptions, though. Booth, Francesconi and Frank
(2003) derive a model that distinguishes between the initial pay increase upon promotion and subse-
quent pay increases. Under the assumption that women have worse market alternatives, the model
implications are consistent with their empirical findings that gender does not affect promotion rates
in UK, though women receive lower wage gains. Baldwin, Butler and Johnson (2001) identify the
effects of occupational segregation on gender wage gaps using a hierarchical discrimination model
in which men dislike supervision by female managers. They predict an exponential decline in the
relative proportion of female workers in the top tiers of the job ladder, which is in line with the
evidence from a 1988 CPS sample of workers in the insurance industry.
In contrast, it is common practice in the empirical literature to also include gender among
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the determinants of job mobility and promotion likelihoods (see, among others, Groot and van den
Brink, 1996; Booth and Francesconi, 2000; Blau and deVaro, 2007) in view that men and women may
differ in alternative opportunities (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 1990; Royalty, 1998)
as well as in job search costs (Meitzen, 1986). For instance, women may face more constraints
either to work longer hours or even to remain in the labor market. If women are more likely to
quit, firms will have less incentives to train and promote them. Moreover, if women view promotion
as unlikely due to discriminatory promotion practices, they may refrain to put themselves forward
for training programmes at the firm (Arrow, 1972). See, among others, Cabral et al. (1981), Spurr
(1990), Cannings and Montmarquette (1991), McCue (1996), Barnett, Baron and Stuart (2000),
Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), Blau and deVaro (2007), and Acosta (2010) for supporting evidence
as well as Lewis (1986), Powell and Butterfield (1994), Paulin and Mellor (1996), Petersen and
Saporta (2004), and Giuliano, Levine and Leonard (2011) for evidence against gender differences.
The papers closest to ours are McCue (1996) and Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2006). The former
documents that it takes on average more time for women and black men to get a promotion than for
white males using data from PSID (1976-1988). Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2006) analyze gender
differences in time to promotion for workers within the metallurgical industry in Finland. They
evince that women usually take more time to get a promotion than men with similar jobs, even if
women are consistently more productive than men. Our findings are interestingly different in that
the Brazilian manufacturing industry appears to feature more gender differential for domestic firms
relative to foreign-owned.
The remainder of this paper ensues as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of our
database, whereas Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology that we employ to assess
whether there is gender differences in promotions. Section 4 then reports the findings of our
empirical analysis. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Data description
The data set we employ gathers information from several databases. In particular, it combines data
from the Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS), covering the period running from 1991 to
2005, as well as data from the 1996 Foreign Trade Census of the Foreign Trade Secretary (SECEX)
and from the 2000 Census of Foreign Capital (CEB).
RAIS is the administrative registry of the Ministry of Labor that provides socioeconomic in-
formation regarding the employees of every firm in the Brazilian formal sector. It reports the
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employees’ identifying security number, age, gender, schooling level, job tenure, average monthly
salary (including performance bonus and commissions), occupation (as reported by the employer),
number of hours at work, type of labor contract, and month of admission. In addition, it also
documents the firm’s identifying fiscal number, sector of activity, and location. We make use of
the SECEX data to gather information on how much each firm exports as a proxy for productivity.
Unfortunately, it is very hard to gather exports data for sectors other than the transformation
industry. This is the main reason why we have to focus on the latter.
The Central Bank of Brazil publishes the CEB every five years, collecting information on the
origin of the shareholders’ capital for every firm in Brazil. We employ the CEB to classify firms
either as domestic or multinational. We define as multinational a firm in which more than 50% of the
shareholders’ capital is foreign.2 Matching data from RAIS and CEB reveals that women amount
to 21% of the employees in multinationals of the Brazilian manufacturing industry, occupying 13%
of their managerial positions. The figures are similar for domestic firms (i.e., with less than 50%
of foreign capital): 25% and 15%, respectively.
To form a homogeneous RAIS sample, we focus on individuals meeting the following criteria.
First, the individual must work in a profit-seeking private firm with 500 or more employees in the
Brazilian manufacturing industry. We focus exclusively on large firms because smaller firms have
not enough internal turnover at the managerial level. Although these large firms respond only for
5.29% of the firms in the Brazilian manufacturing industry, they employ 32.9% of the workers in
the sector, of which a quarter are female. Second, we consider only individuals with a university
degree. The proportion of workers holding a university degree has increased from 9.58% in 1996
to 13.93% in 2005 within our sample of large Brazilian manufacturing firms. Third, the individual
must have joined the firm between January 1991 and December 1995. Fourth, the individual must
work as an accountant, administrator, director, economist, engineer, intermediate manager, lawyer,
manager, or purchases/sales supervisor. Fifth, the individual must also have a labor contract with
no expiration date.
The resulting sample includes 1,422 firms, of which 297 (20.9%) are multinationals, that alto-
gether employ 23,737 male and 3,552 female workers. The average individual in our sample is about
34 years old, working around 43 hours per week. As for occupations, engineers are the mode with
32.5% of the observations due to the predominance of male workers in the sample—the proportion
2 The threshold at 50% is arbitrary, but also pretty harmless. The fraction of foreign capital concentrates either
at zero (relative frequency of 65.83%) or at one (18.35%) and hence varying the cutoff point from 25% to 75% does
not change any of the findings we report in the subsequent sections.
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of engineers among female workers is only 19.4%. There is a fraction of 29.0% of men occupying
top management positions, whereas this figure drops to 18.7% for women. Table 1 stratifies the
sample according to occupation and gender, whereas Table 2 reports the sample averages of the
individuals’ main characteristics according to censoring and gender.
Note that the promotion duration variable in Table 2 considers only promotions within the
same firm (i.e., intra-firm promotions). We thus treat inter-firm promotions as right censoring. We
prefer not to examine promotions through firm switches because of selection issues. The sample
we have allows us to track the career of the worker only within large firms in the transformation
industry. This would likely bias any duration analysis if male workers tend to hold more sector-
specific positions than female workers. For instance, engineering-related jobs involve much more
sector-specific skills than HR jobs. In addition, inter-firm analyses would also entail biased results
in the event that male and female workers have different reactions to promotion offers from smaller
firms. This would happen because our sample considers only large firms and hence we would
incorrectly classify as right censored a worker that gets a promotion to a top management position
in a smaller firm. To avoid such biases, we restrict attention to intra-firm promotions.
Table 3 examines gender differences in a more in-depth fashion by looking at career progression
according to whether the firm is domestic or multinational. The first panel shows that nonpromoted
female workers receive an average monthly salary of about R$ 4,420 in domestic firms and roughly
of R$ 6,150 in multinationals. These figures increase respectively to R$ 8,130 and R$ 10,450
after promotion. The promoted-to-nonpromoted salary ratios are then of 1.84 in domestic firms
and of 1.70 in multinationals. We find a similar pattern for nonpromoted and promoted male
workers, though with lower promoted-to-nonpromoted salary ratios: namely, 63% salary increase
after promotion in domestic firms as opposed to 52% in foreign firms. Albeit career progression
has a stronger impact in domestic firms, the average salary in multinationals are much higher on
average. It is about 39% and 25% higher for female and male nonpromoted workers, whereas this
gap reduces to 28% and 17% for female and male workers in top management positions. It is also
interesting to observe that gender differences in salary are much lower in multinationals. Male
managers receive less than 10% more than their female counterparts in multinationals. This gap is
more than twofold for domestic firms. The same pattern arises, though with much higher gender
differences, for workers not in top management positions (viz., 36% in domestic firms against 22%
in multinationals).
As what concerns the probability of getting a promotion, the second panel of Table 3 documents
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two findings. First, multinationals promote more than domestic firms, probably because they are
larger on average and hence have more managerial positions to offer than domestic firms. Second,
gender differences are very large, with a much higher fraction of promoted men than women. In
particular, less than 5% of the female workers receive a promotion in domestic firms as opposed to
7.68% of the men. In line with the first result, these fractions increase in multinationals to 7.18%
and 10.09% for female and male workers, respectively. Finally, the third panel looks at the average
time it takes to get a promotion by gender and firm ownership. Interestingly, the time to promotion
is lower for women than for men, especially in domestic firms. Note that, as we restrict attention
to uncensored observations, this average duration is conditional on getting a promotion within the
sample period and, as aforementioned, women are less likely to get promoted in domestic firms.
To appreciate the overall effect, we must not only consider the probability of getting a promotion,
but also consider the censored observations in the right tail of the duration distribution. Similarly,
even if more likely, it takes on average more time to obtain a promotion in a multinational than in
a domestic firm. This is consistent with a fiercer competition in multinationals.
Altogether, women seem less likely to receive a promotion, but they take less time than men
if they ever accomplish that. In the absence of affirmative action, the latter provides indirect
evidence that promoted women are on average more productive than promoted men (despite their
lower average salary). In contrast, although promotions are more frequent in multinationals, they
take on average 5 to 6 weeks more to take place than in domestic firms. In the next Section, we
describe the models we employ to examine these gender and firm ownership effects more thoroughly
by controlling for other individual and firm characteristics.
3 Duration models for time to promotion
In this section, we describe the duration model that we estimate to address gender differences in
time to promotion. Although we also consider a more general semiparametric duration model later,
we start with a simple linear regression specification for the log of the time to promotion:
lnT ∗i = Xi β + i, (1)
where T ∗i gauges how much time it takes to the individual i to obtain a promotion, Xi is a vector
of control variates, and i is an error term with scale and shape parameters σ and ς, respectively. In
the context of duration models, (1) corresponds to an accelerated failure time (AFT) specification.
We construct the duration variable by following from January 1996 to December 2005 every
individual that enters the RAIS database between January 1991 and December 1995. As some
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individuals do not obtain a promotion to managerial positions within the sample, we do not observe
the time they take to get a promotion and hence we classify them as nonpromoted. In contrast, we
classify as zero durations individuals whose first position within the firm is at the top managerial
level (i.e., either as a manager or as a director). We initially exclude these individuals from the
AFT regression in view that (1) involves a log transformation of the duration. Altogether, this
sample criteria ensure that promotion durations may exhibit only right censoring.
Under right censoring, instead of observing the time to promotion T ∗i for each individual in the
sample, we have information only on the following promotion duration variable:
Ti =
{
T ∗i in the absence of censorship
Ri under right censoring
(2)
where Ri corresponds to how much time the individual i has on the job up to December 2005. If
the individual i exits the firm before December 2005, then the right-censoring variable Ri denotes
tenure on the job, without receiving a promotion, up to the exit date.
The control variables at the individual level come from the RAIS database and refer to the
month at which the individual starts at the firm. Using first-month data for individual-specific
controls avoids further endogeneity issues, but it has the disadvantage of ruling out hours worked
as a control given that these data are available only from 1995. In contrast, information at the firm
level stems from the RAIS database of January 1996, from the SECEX data of the year 1996, and
from the 2000 CEB.
We construct the binary variable male to control for the individual’s gender. We additionally
include the dummy variables multinational and modern that respectively take value one for
firms with more than 50% of foreign capital and for firms from a technology-intensive sector.3
Also, we consider the interaction dummy male×multinational as well as several continuous
variables to control for firm-specific factors such as productivity and exposure to international
markets. More specifically, size and exports correspond to the natural logarithm of the number
of employees and of the total exports (in USD billions) of the firm that the individual works for,
respectively. university ratio is the proportion of employees in the firm with a university degree,
whereas mean wage is the average monthly stipend within the firm. We also consider a measure
of turnover that gauges the job flow intensity of the firm by means of the ratio of job flow
(admissions plus dismissals) to the number of employees in the firm.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of the error term in (1), with density function
3 In particular, we consider the following sectors as modern: electrical and communication materials, mechanical,
chemical and pharmaceutical, and automobile and other transport materials. Their codes at the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) are 4506, 4510, 4512 and 4515, respectively.
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f and survival function S = 1 − F , and let θ = (β, σ, ς) denote the parameter vector. The log-
likelihood function then reads
LN (θ) =
N∑
i=1
(1− I(RC)i ) ln
[
f(i)/σ
]
+
N∑
i=1
I
(RC)
i lnS(i) (3)
where I
(RC)
i is the indicator function that takes value one if there is right censoring, zero otherwise.
In particular, we assume a generalized gamma distribution, with scale and shape parameters σ
and ς. The generalized gamma distribution is very flexible, encompassing both the lognormal and
Weibull distributions (ς = 0 and ς = 1, respectively). To account for heterogeneity, we specify
duration models with frailty, treating the unobserved individual effects as random draws from a
gamma distribution with variance λ.
We initially suppose that censoring is independent of the regressors. This is a very strong
assumption in that it rules out the situation in which women are more likely to quit their jobs
than men, as in Lazear and Rosen’s (1990) model.4 Table 2 documents that 6.2% of the durations
relating to male workers exhibit no censoring, whereas 65.1% display right censoring and 28.7%
zero durations. These figures are respectively 4.5%, 76.8%, and 18.7% for female workers. These
differences suggest to some extent that censoring depends on gender, violating the independence
assumption. We thus control for covariate-dependent censoring by employing Khan and Tamer’s
(2007) partial rank estimator. The latter entails distribution-free estimates of the regression co-
efficients without imposing any parametric specification on the link function (see next subsection
for more details). In the empirical analysis, we show that accommodating for this more general
form of censoring is paramount to examine promotion durations within the Brazilian manufacturing
industry.
3.1 Partial rank estimation of duration models
Khan and Tamer (2007) propose a partial rank estimator for duration models that imposes no para-
metric specification on the baseline hazard function and allows for general forms of censoring. For in-
stance, in the right-censored version of Ridder’s (1990) generalized accelerated failure time (GAFT)
model, one observes Y i = (Ti, I
(RC)
i )
′, where the duration Ti = min{`−1(Xi β + i), `−1(Ri)}
with Ri denoting the censoring variable and `(·) some unknown monotone link function, and
I
(RC)
i = I
{
`−1(Xi β + i) ≤ `−1(Ri)
}
= I{Xi β + i ≤ Ri} indicates whether there is right cen-
4 The empirical evidence is conflicting at best. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen’s (2006) results confirm that women
quit more often than men, whereas Blau and Kahn (1981) and Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) find no evidence supporting
such gender differences.
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soring.5 As before, Ti = T
∗
i for uncensored observations, and Ti = Ri otherwise.
Similarly to Han’s (1987) maximum rank correlation estimator, the idea is to find a transfor-
mation Fij = f(Y i,Y j) such that
E
[
I{Fij ≥ 0}
∣∣∣Xi, Xj] = E [I{Fji ≥ 0} ∣∣∣Xi, Xj] (4)
if and only if Xi β ≥ Xj β. Han (1987) considers Fij = T ∗i − T ∗j in the context of uncensored
transformation models, which turns out to produce inconsistent estimates if the censoring variable
Ri depends somehow on the covariates Xi. Instead, Khan and Tamer set Fij = T¯i − Tj , where
T¯i = I
(RC)
i Ti + (1− I(RC)i )× (+∞) with 0× (+∞) = 0. As such,
I{Fij ≥ 0} = I{T¯i − Tj ≥ 0} = 1− I(RC)i + I(RC)i I{Ti ≥ Tj}. (5)
It then follows that `(Ti) ≤Xiβ + i ≤ `(T¯i) and hence
Xiβ ≥Xjβ ⇒ Pr(T¯i ≥ Tj) ≥ 1/2 (6)
by monotonicity of `(·).
Identification is possible only up to scale given that the function `(·) is unknown and hence it
is more convenient to reparameterize the model by setting β = (1,θ′)′. The partial rank estimator
of θ then is
θ̂ = argmaxθ∈Θ
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
I
(RC)
i I{Ti < Tj} I{Xiβ <Xjβ}, (7)
where Θ is the parameter space. Note that the rank correlation function depends only on uncensored
observations, though their ranks consider all observations with longer or equal durations. The
partial rank estimator thus combines the information on both censored and uncensored observations,
just as in the partial maximum likelihood method put forth by Cox (1972, 1975). In addition, it
is straightforward to observe that Khan and Tamer’s (2007) partial rank estimator is numerically
equivalent to Han’s (1987) maximum rank correlation estimator in the absence of censoring as well
as in the case of fixed censoring (e.g., Ri = R).
Khan and Tamer (2007) characterize the consistency and asymptotic normality of the partial
rank estimator in (7) under the usual regularity conditions for rank-based semiparametric estima-
tors. See, for instance, Sherman (1993) for similar regularity conditions in the context of maximum
rank correlation.
5 Note that it is also possible to extend the partial rank framework to consider double censoring.
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4 Promotions in the Brazilian manufacturing industry
In this section, we present estimation results for both parametric and semiparametric specifications.
Subsection 4.1 performs a preliminary regression analysis of time to promotion based on parametric
duration models. We estimate the models by maximum likelihood assuming a generalized gamma
distribution, which nests both lognormal and Weibull distributions. For each of these distributions,
we regress the logarithm of the time to promotion on individual and firm characteristics for a
subsample that excludes individuals that start at a managerial position (i.e., with time to promotion
equal to zero). In addition, we report coefficient estimates both with and without controls for the
initial occupation at the firm.
Subsection 4.2 reports partial-rank estimates of the semiparametric time-to-promotion model
for different subsamples. To allow for direct comparison with the parametric analysis, we first
exclude individuals that start at a managerial position from our sample and then carry out the
regression both with and without controls for the initial occupation at the firm. Finally, we also
estimate a semiparametric time-to-promotion model for every individual in our sample, regardless
of whether already starting at a managerial position.
4.1 Preliminary analysis
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the accelerated failure time models with Gamma frailty for
the different error distributions as well as log-likelihood ratio tests for the lognormal and Weibull
distributions.6 The estimates of the regression coefficients are very similar regardless of the distri-
bution assumption. They indicate that, within firms of domestic capital, there are very significant
gender differences in promotions. In particular, male employees wait significantly less than female
employees to get a promotion. The time to promotion for men is on average between 32.71% and
37.39% shorter than that for women depending on the specification. Gender differences are less
pronounced in multinationals, though still significant. Male workers now take on average between
27.42% and 31.13% less time to get a promotion than women. In addition, time to promotion is
relatively shorter, though not significantly, within multinationals than within domestic firms re-
gardless of gender.7 Table 5 validates these claims through formal hypothesis testing. The first
6 Although we report only nonrobust standard errors, clustering by firm changes only very marginally the
confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates. All qualitative results thus remain valid for cluster-robust standard
errors.
7 We compute these effects by exponentiating the (sum of) regression coefficient(s) and then subtracting one. For
instance, specification (2) in Table 4 gives way to a change of exp(−0.4524) − 1 = −36.39% in the average time to
promotion if the individual is male. This effect reduces to exp(−0.4524 + 0.0935)− 1 = −30.16% if the individual is
male and works at a multinational.
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panel of Table 5 documents that, even though multinationals display less gender differences than
domestic firms, they are still significant at the 1% level of significance regardless of the distribu-
tion one employs. The second panel also shows that males tend to get a promotion faster within
multinationals than within domestic firms.
As for the other controls, it is interesting to observe that the size effect is insignificant, though
time to promotion is increasing with productivity and exposure to international markets given the
sign of the coefficient estimates for exports, mean wage, and modern. This is consistent with
a more competitive environment as what concerns internal turnover within more productive firms
(including Brazilian multinationals; see Footnote 1). In contrast, it is decreasing with university
ratio and turnover, reflecting competition effects within the firm and the sector, respectively.
The remaining regression coefficients are all as expected. For instance, there is a significant negative
relationship between time to promotion and age, which is not surprising given that the latter acts
as a proxy for experience. In addition, intermediate managers and supervisors wait substantially
less to obtain a promotion to a managerial position.
The frailty parameter that regulates the variance of the individual random effects does not
differ from zero as long as one considers either a generalized gamma or lognormal distribution.8
In contrast, the frailty variance is quite close to one for the Weibull distribution, indicating to
some extent the presence of individual random effects. However, it is not clear whether this is
really a material indication of heterogeneity given that a frailty-implied gamma mixture of Weibull
variates results in a Burr distribution, which is very similar to the generalized gamma distribution
(Rodriguez, 1977). In fact, given that we restrict attention to individuals that satisfy a number
of criteria, our sample is relatively very homogeneous and hence it is not surprising that we find
little evidence of individual random effects. Table 6 confirms that, despite the similarity of the
regression coefficients, the statistical evidence favors the extra flexibility of the generalized gamma
distribution (or Weibull with frailty) as opposed to the more parsimonious lognormal distribution.9
Finally, it is worth stressing that the robustness of the parametric results is not only to the
specification of the error distribution. Interacting the occupational dummy with gender yields
insignificant regression coefficients and does not lead to any qualitative difference in the results.
Splitting the firms into exporting and nonexporting by means of a dummy variable does not help
much either. It turns out that 97% of the foreign-owned firms export. This rules out any interaction
8 Not surprisingly, the coefficient estimates for the duration models without frailty are almost identical to the
ones in Table 4 regardless of the distribution. These results are available from the authors upon request.
9 We report the p-value coming from usual chi-squared distribution for the LR test of the generalized gamma
versus the lognormal even if the shape parameter is in the boundary.
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between the origin of capital and the dummy relating to whether the firm exports or not, for
otherwise multicollinearity kicks in, rendering insignificant and completely unreliable coefficient
estimates. As a matter of fact, the same pattern arises if we classify firms by size and interact the
resulting large firm dummy with origin of capital. Our findings seem also specific to top management
positions. Reestimating the duration models for the time it takes to get a promotion to intermediate
management positions (i.e., intermediate managers and supervisors) results in insignificant effects
for gender, origin of capital, and their interaction. Although we do not report these robustness
checks to conserve on space, they are obviously available from the authors upon request.
4.2 Semiparametric analysis
We now investigate the extent to which the log-linear specification and the assumption of covariate-
independent censoring affect the results. The latter is particularly a concern given that attrition
rates are expected to differ by gender (Lazear and Rosen, 1990) and we treat job exits as right
censoring. In addition, the semiparametric duration model also accommodates left censoring, al-
lowing us to exploit the information content of workers that start at managerial positions (i.e., with
zero durations). To better understand the effects of dropping the covariate-independent censoring
assumption and of allowing for left censoring, we document in what follows both results.
As frailty does not seem to matter much, we estimate the duration model using Khan and
Tamer’s (2007) semiparametric estimator. As the latter relies on rank-based methods, it consis-
tently estimate the relative magnitude of the regression coefficients for any strictly monotonic link
function (in particular, we fix the coefficient of exports to unit). This results in a semiparametric
variant of the AFT model in (1) under which the link function is strictly monotonic, but otherwise
unknown. This is in stark contrast to the simple log transformation that (1) imposes. Moreover,
the partial-rank estimator does not require specifying a parametric family for the error distribution.
We employ a SAS/IML genetic algorithm to compute the partial rank estimator, whereas we
obtain standard errors by means of bootstrap methods as in Subbotin (2008). The latter hinges on
100 artificial samples with the same number of observations as the original sample. We consider
two specifications. The first accounts for the position at which the individual starts at the firm and
hence we must exclude every individual that already begins at a managerial position, that is to say,
any individual with time to promotion equal to zero. The second specification does not control for
the starting occupation and so we consider samples both with and without individuals with zero
duration.10 Adding individuals that start at a managerial position to the sample ameliorates the
10 Note that direct comparison between the parametric and semiparametric duration analyses is only possible for
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precision of the estimates due to the increase in the sample size, but at the expense of inducing a
sample selection bias.
Table 7 reveals that the qualitative findings are quite robust to the specification (i.e., with
or without starting occupation) as well as to the sample (with or without zero durations). We
indeed observe no variation in the sign of the coefficient estimates across the different specifications
and samples. Accounting for previous occupation does not affect much the coefficient estimates
of interest, but it improves considerably their precision. The partial rank estimates unveil that
females are in disadvantage in domestic firms relative to male workers, but significantly less so
within foreign-owned companies. Including individuals with zero duration in the sample brings
about additional information that reinforces the moderating effect of multinationals to the extent
of seemingly eliminating gender differences in promotion.11
Table 8 confirms these results by means of formal Wald tests for linear restrictions. In fact,
we cannot even reject the null of no gender differences within foreign-owned companies for the
specifications that do not control for previous occupation. The partial rank estimates also indicate
that it takes less time for a male worker to obtain a promotion within multinationals. Further, if
we extract the information in the cross-section of individuals that start in the top management of
their firms, we cannot anymore reject at the 5% level of significance that time to promotion for
men does not depend on firm ownership.
It is worth stressing that the descriptive statistics we report in Table 3 are not inconsistent
with this regression results. Bear in mind that women take less time to be promoted than men
in domestic firms only conditional on getting a promotion. However, the relative frequency of
promoted women in domestic firms is very low and, in addition, much lower than the relative
frequency in multinationals. The fact that right censoring depends on gender and firm ownership
not only confirms the importance of the semiparametric duration analysis, but also elucidates that
the results in Table 3 seem contradicting essentially because they completely ignore the censored
observations in the right tail of the duration distribution.
All in all, our findings contribute to the literature that compares multinationals and domestic
firms (Doms and Jensen, 2006; Greene et al., 2009) as well as to the literature showing that gender
differences may depend on the nature of the firm (see, e.g., deVaro and Brookshire, 2007). The
impact of individuals that start at managerial positions is also interesting inasmuch as it reflects
the subsample that excludes workers starting at managerial positions.
11 Adding over 7,500 observations to the regression has a substantial impact in the precision of the coefficient
estimates, with up to 95% drops in their standard errors (the only exception is the coefficient for AGE, whose
standard error slightly increases).
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self-selection effects. Before discussing self-selection issues and the reasons why gender differences
are less pronounced in multinationals, we first briefly look into two other dimensions in which
gender differences in promotions might arise, namely, pay rise due to promotion and likelihood of
a promotion.
4.3 Wage growth and promotion likelihood
In this section, we investigate gender differences in promotion likelihoods and in wage growths. As
per the latter, we employ monthly wage information of workers over time to estimate longitudinal
models of the effect of promotions on wages. The dummy variable promotion takes value one for
every month after a promotion and zero otherwise. We estimate both random- and fixed-effects
panel regressions for males and females and then compare the coefficient estimates of interest to
assess whether the impact of promotions on wages differs according to the gender. Apart from
the previous firm-specific covariates, we control for job tenure and starting occupation as well as
for interaction effects due to promotions within multinationals. The latter is to capture, if any,
differential wage effects of promotions in foreign-owned firms.
Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates with their robust standard errors as well as Wald
tests for the equality of the coefficients of interest as estimated from the samples of males and
females. As expected, the results show that promotion increases wages of both males and females.
The specification with random effects suggest that women receive on average higher increases in
wages after a promotion within domestic firms. In contrast, we cannot reject similar increases for
men and women in domestic firms if restricting attention to fixed individual effects as well as in
foreign-owned companies regardless of whether the individual effects are random or fixed. Finally,
the coefficient estimate of the interaction dummy evince that pay increases due to promotions are
somewhat smaller in multinationals.
To verify whether the probability of promotion depends on gender, we run logit regressions in
which the dependent variable takes value one if the individual obtains a promotion to a managerial
position, or else it equals zero. We control once more for the gender, occupation, and job tenure
of the individual as well as for the same firm-specific covariates as before. The results in Table 10
evince that domestic firms seems to display gender differences in promotions not only in terms of
how much time it takes to get a promotion, but also in terms of promotion likelihood. They also
suggest that, apart from featuring less gender differences, it is more likely to obtain a promotion
in a multinational for both genders. This is similar to the findings of the preliminary parametric
analysis concerning time to promotion, reflecting perhaps the weaknesses they share, namely, the
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restrictiveness of the parametric specification and of the regressors’ exogeneity assumption.
In sum, we document that wage gains after promotion does not contribute to creating gender
differential at least within foreign-owned firms. The evidence is weaker for domestic firms. The logit
regressions for the probability of a promotion indicate that women are in disadvantage within do-
mestic firms but less so in multinationals, thereof confirming the time-to-promotion results. Finally,
multinationals are also characterized by higher likelihoods of promotion regardless of gender.
4.4 Foreign ownership and gender differences
It remains to explain how gender differences arise and why they vary according to ownership.
The first point to notice is that a taste for discrimination as in Becker (1957) does not survive
long if there is enough competition amongst firms/employers (Arrow, 1972). Of course, one could
always claim that, in addition to strong cultural differences, labor market institutions in Brazil
are such that they actually curb the sort of competition that would drive away taste for gender
discrimination. As we have no means to falsify such a conjecture, we turn our attention to the next
suspect, namely, statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Phelps, 1972; Spence, 1973).
Assessing the quality of a worker involves costs and hence some employers might consider
costless inference methods such as observing the worker’s gender. These employers would then
apply their prior beliefs about the expected qualification of the worker conditional on gender as a
hiring/promotion criterion. This would lead to statistical discrimination against a particular gender.
Berk (2001) extends the statistical discrimination model to a world in which workers compete for
jobs/promotions. It turns out that the self-selection that results from individuals rationally selecting
which jobs/promotions to apply for helps mitigating (and sometimes even overcompensating) the
effects of statistical discrimination. The self-selection mechanism is pretty simple. An individual
from the gender with lower average qualifications would only apply for a job/promotion if the
probability of getting the job/promotion compensates the application costs. This is more likely to
occur if the individual has above-average qualifications.
We next argue that our results are consistent with Berk’s (2001) model implications under the
assumption that, on average, women face more constraints than men to work long hours or to
do business trips. This is enough to generate statistical discrimination against women. A career-
minded woman who applies for a job/promotion in a firm with a preference for dedicated employees
only does so because she rationally believes that her odds of being hired/promoted compensate
the effort to go through the application process. This means that her qualifications have to be
sufficiently high to stand a chance despite discrimination. The latter entails the self-selection bit.
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To establish the differences between multinationals and domestic firms, we rely on two stylized facts
of the Brazilian labor market (OECD, 2008). The first is that domestic firms offer a more flexible
package in terms of working hours and business trips than multinationals. This makes them more
appealing to less ambitious/career-concerned individuals (regardless of their gender). The second
is that multinationals compete more fiercely for ambitious/career-minded highly-skilled workers,
promoting on average better pay than domestic firms (see, e.g., Martins and Esteves, 2008).
We find some indirect evidence supporting the above claims.12 On the one hand, male workers
tend to work similar hours in foreign-owned and domestic firms regardless of whether they have been
promoted or not. The only difference is in the lower support of the distribution, with promoted men
working much harder than nonpromoted ones (22 to 44 hours versus 8 to 44 hours, respectively).
This is consistent with the the fact that promoted workers are more likely to be career-minded.
On the other hand, nonpromoted female employees work relatively much less only in domestic
firms (10 to 44 hours). This is in line with domestic firms offering more flexible packages. In
addition, the fact that women work longer hours in multinationals (36 to 44 hours regardless of
whether promoted or not) is consistent with self-selection. As the latter alleviates the impact of
statistical discrimination, we fail to observe as much gender difference in foreign-owned companies
as in domestic firms.
The impact of individuals that start at managerial positions in the coefficient estimates rein-
forces the self-selection story. These are precisely the workers that are most likely to have the
highest qualifications and hence their inclusion in the sample potentiates self-selection effects. As
the latter reduces the imprint of statistical discrimination, it is not surprising that we cannot reject
gender differences in multinationals for the sample that includes individuals with zero durations.
This is because the repercussion to self-selection is higher in multinationals given that they compete
more intensively for career-minded workers.
Finally, it is important to stress that our sample is very homogeneous as what concerns observed
characteristics given that we consider only highly-skilled individuals, with university degree and
pursuing specific career types. The impact of career-mindness in the time to promotion may
differ across different levels of observed skills and hence our findings are completely silent about
gender differences for low-skilled workers. However, we have no good reason to believe that the
skill distribution is gender specific and hence differentiating between low- and high-skilled workers
12 Note that, unfortunately, we observe only the effects of self-selection. We cannot properly model the selection
mechanism given that we do not observe many characteristics that determine individual career-mindness, such as
marital status and number of child dependents. Similarly, we have information neither about household characteristics
(e.g., the presence of other income earner or dependents at home, marital status) nor on leave and vacation periods.
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would likely not bring many insights to this study.
4.5 Managerial positions and gender concerns
We are so far treating gender concerns in a static manner in that we implicitly assume that labor
market conditions did not change much over the sample period. In what follows, we first check
whether recent trends in the labor market are responsible for our findings and then examine whether
gender concerns drive the creation of new managerial positions.
Figure 2 depicts the female and male participation in top management from 1996 to 2010 for a
sample of individuals with university degrees. The female participation increases more than twofold
from 1996 to 2010. In particular, it rises from 8.5% to 19.9% in domestic firms, whereas it grows
from 8.5% to 17.6% in multinationals. Interestingly, the participation is higher for domestic firms
than for multinationals and hence one would expect gender differences to decline especially for
domestic firms. This does not however contradict our finding that there are less gender differences
in multinationals. To appreciate that, one must also look at changes in the number of managerial
positions available at domestic and multinational firms from 1996 to 2010. In particular, the number
of male workers, with a university degree, at managerial positions decreases from 11,774 to 9,730
in domestic firms (i.e., a 17% drop), whereas it increases from 10,226 to 17,684 in multinationals
(i.e., by 73%). The corresponding figures for female managers/directors imply increases of 122% for
domestic firms (from 1,093 to 2,424) and of 298% for multinationals (from 947 to 3,768). It seems
that most promoted women in domestic firms took the place of a male manager/director, thereof
increasing their participation in top management. The same does not apply to multinationals, for
which promotions are mainly due to the increase of managerial positions (of which mostly are taken
by women). See also Martins and Esteves (2008) for patterns of external and internal hire in Brazil.
Accordingly, the only implication of Figure 2 as what concerns the results in the previous section is
that they are not an artifact due to the recent trends in female participation in the labor market.
As for the creation of new top management positions, for each uncensored observation, we
construct two dummy variables: ∆
(ij)
F and ∆
(ij)
M . The former takes value one if the number of
women in top management positions in firm j has increased after the promotion of individual i;
zero otherwise. The latter is the analogous dummy variable for male workers, assuming value one
if the number of men in top management positions in firm j has increased after the promotion of
individual i; zero otherwise. Table 11 reports the relative frequency of these dummy variables by
gender and by firm ownership.
Consider first the case in which ∆
(ij)
F = ∆
(ij)
M = 0. This corresponds to promotions to existing
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Figure 2: Female and male participation at top management positions from 1996 to 2010
positions so as to substitute someone who has quit the firm. This situation responds for 52% of
the promotions of female workers in domestic firms, whereas 40% of the cases in multinationals.
The corresponding figures for male workers are 52.19% and 46%, respectively. This means that
women are relatively more likely to get promotions to newly created top management positions in
multinationals than men. Note also that a female promotion with ∆
(ij)
F = 0 means that she has
replaced another woman, whereas a male promotion with ∆
(ij)
M = 0 implies that he has replaced
another man in the top management position. The frequency of promoted women in domestic firms
with ∆
(ij)
F = 0 is 58.33%, whereas it is only 45.45% in multinationals. The corresponding figures
for promoted men with ∆
(ij)
M = 0 are 57.77% and 53%, respectively. As before, the gap is much
higher for women than for men. In addition, the relative frequency is (significantly) below 50% only
for multinationals, corroborating the evidence that female promotions in multinationals is mainly
through the increase in the number of top management positions.
5 Conclusion
This paper assesses whether gender matters in the time it takes to get a promotion to a managerial
position in the largest firms of the Brazilian manufacturing industry. The motivation lies not only
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on the natural interest in assessing gender differences in promotion within a developing country, but
also on the general features of the Brazilian data set. In particular, the latter include observations
of multiple workers per establishment at different occupations and hierarchical levels as well as
their career paths in terms of occupation and wages.
We find that there are significative gender differences in promotions within domestic firms.
The evidence for foreign-owned firms is much weaker, though. These findings complement well the
recent evidence that the nature of the firm may entail substantial differences in managerial practices
and in the role of promotions (Doms and Jensen, 2006; deVaro and Brookshire, 2007; Greene
et al., 2009). We argue that the stronger gender differences in domestic firms are a result of the
combination between statistical discrimination and self-selection (Berk, 2001). If career-concerned
women prefer to work in multinational firms, statistical discrimination would become more apparent
within domestic firms.
The presence of statistical discrimination even for highly-skilled workers is obviously a concern.
There is a number of policies that one may employ to mitigate gender gaps in the labor market,
such as comparable worth initiatives and the imposition of quotas for women. However, the lat-
ter examples seem a bit out of the Brazilian reality at the moment. Nopo (2012, Chapter 17)
describes four main policy prescriptions in the case of Latin America: (1) investing in education
early in life, (2) boosting productivity and reducing labor market segregation, (3) fostering a more
equitable division of household responsibilities, and (4) diminishing stereotypes. Investing more in
girls’ education will likely have much more impact on lowly-skilled workers than on highly-skilled.
Similarly, reducing occupational segregation seems much more relevant for workers at the bottom
of the earnings distribution (Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow, 2013). In contrast, promoting a
more equitable division of household responsibilities and reducing stereotyping seem much better
avenues to tackle statistical discrimination against highly-skilled female workers. Policy makers
could, for example, establish more equitable maternity/paternity leaves, expand early childhood
infrastructure, and increase school hours to foster a more equitable division of duties and opportu-
nities within households. As for stereotypes, they survive only in the absence of better information
(Altonji and Pierret, 2001). This means that policy makers should seek to improve as much as pos-
sible information in the job market, even if by means of unorthodox methods, such as promoting
female role models in Brazilian soap operas (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009).
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Table 1
Sample size according to gender and occupation
The label ‘absolute’ refers to the number of observations in that cell, whereas ‘relative’ corresponds to the
relative sample size as a percentage of the total number of observations in that column. We group under
‘aael’ all individuals that work as accountants, administrators, economists, and lawyers.
female male total
occupation
absolute relative absolute relative absolute relative
engineer 689 19.4% 8,171 34.4% 8,860 32.5%
aael group 864 24.3% 2,637 11.1% 3,501 12.8%
intermediate manager 773 21.8% 3,334 14.0% 4,107 15.1%
supervisor 562 15.8% 2,721 11.5% 3,283 12.0%
manager and director 664 18.7% 6,874 29.0% 7,538 27.6%
total 3,552 100% 23,737 100% 27,289 100%
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Table 3
Career progression by gender and firm ownership
The first panel reports average salary (in BRL) for promoted and nonpromoted workers by gender and
by whether the firm is domestic or multinational. The second and third panels reveal similar averages
for the probability of getting a promotion and for their durations (in weeks), respectively. The latter
is over uncensored observations, corresponding to the time it takes to get a promotion conditional on
getting a promotion.
domestic multinational
salary
nonpromoted promoted nonpromoted promoted
female 4,420.06 8,133.47 6,146.19 10,444.11
male 5,992.60 9,754.86 7,494.26 11,427.58
promotion likelihood domestic multinational
female 0.0463 0.0718
male 0.0768 0.1009
time to promotion domestic multinational
female 38.17 39.57
male 44.29 44.38
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Table 4
Maximum likelihood estimates of the AFT models with gamma frailty
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the time to promotion. We report maximum likelihood
estimates of the regression coefficients as well as of the distributional and frailty parameters. Figures
within brackets correspond to standard errors. We exclude the AAEL group from the set of occupational
dummies in columns (2), (4) and (6).
generalized gamma lognormal Weibull
covariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
male −0.3979
(0.0928)
−0.4524
(0.0930)
−0.4077
(0.0940)
−0.4683
(0.0944)
−0.3962
(0.0925)
−0.4524
(0.0930)
male×multinational 0.0736
(0.1350)
0.0935
(0.1347)
0.0872
(0.1402)
0.0954
(0.1400)
0.0746
(0.1347)
0.0932
(0.1348)
multinational −0.4142
(0.1307)
−0.4195
(0.1302)
−0.4547
(0.1351)
−0.4436
(0.1349)
−0.4164
(0.1304)
−0.4195
(0.1303)
age −0.0087
(0.0030)
−0.0045
(0.0031)
−0.0135
(0.0030)
−0.0086
(0.0031)
−0.0090
(0.0030)
−0.0045
(0.0031)
ln(size) 0.0254
(0.0272)
0.0255
(0.0269)
0.0348
(0.0292)
0.0345
(0.0291)
0.0246
(0.0271)
0.0256
(0.0270)
exports 0.3975
(0.1440)
0.3649
(0.1424)
0.4101
(0.1482)
0.4168
(0.1485)
0.3974
(0.1432)
0.3657
(0.1425)
university ratio −1.2538
(0.2776)
−1.0992
(0.2778)
−1.3779
(0.3010)
−1.2028
(0.3011)
−1.2478
(0.2773)
−1.1004
(0.2780)
turnover −0.2599
(0.0930)
−0.2274
(0.0942)
−0.2484
(0.1020)
−0.2066
(0.1022)
−0.2650
(0.0933)
−0.2272
(0.0942)
mean wage 0.0001
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0000)
modern 0.4650
(0.0529)
0.4515
(0.0518)
0.5053
(0.0546)
0.4830
(0.0546)
0.4686
(0.0521)
0.4518
(0.0518)
engineer 0.0339
(0.0640)
0.0896
(0.0663)
0.0344
(0.0640)
intermediate manager −0.3222
(0.0676)
−0.3027
(0.0709)
−0.3219
(0.0677)
supervisor −0.1572
(0.0746)
−0.0979
(0.0782)
−0.1564
(0.0746)
constant 6.0976
(0.3465)
5.8156
(0.3323)
6.2913
(0.2840)
6.2496
(0.2879)
5.9026
(0.2694)
5.8795
(0.2749)
scale σ 0.9904
(0.2983)
0.6521
(0.2303)
1.5919
(0.0280)
1.5838
(0.0278)
0.7385
(0.0223)
0.7305
(0.0218)
shape ς 0.6912
(0.3146)
1.1263
(0.4028)
0 0 1 1
frailty variance λ 0.2247
(1.0610)
1.7164
(1.2459)
0.0000
(0.0013)
0.0001
(0.0024)
1.2212
(0.4301)
1.3379
(0.4225)
sample size 19,751 19,751 19,751
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Table 5
Likelihood-ratio tests for linear restrictions in the AFT coefficients
The restricted log-likelihood value refers to constraining the maximum likelihood estimator
so that the sum of the regression coefficients is zero. The first panel tests whether there
is gender differences in time to promotion within multinational firms, whereas the second
examines whether it takes less time for men to get a promotion in multinationals. All results
are for specifications that include occupational dummies.
log-likelihood
distribution
unrestricted restricted
LR statistic p-value
H0: male + male×multinational = 0
generalized gamma -5,929.35 -5,936.36 14.01 0.0002
lognormal -5,950.79 -5,957.32 12.97 0.0003
Weibull -5,929.39 -5,936.40 14.02 0.0004
H0: multinational + male×multinational = 0
generalized gamma -5,929.35 -5,949.19 39.68 0.0000
lognormal -5,950.79 -5,970.37 39.15 0.0000
Weibull -5,929.39 -5,949.23 39.68 0.0000
Table 6
Likelihood ratio tests for the shape parameter
The unrestricted log-likelihood value refers to the maximum likelihood estimation under the
generalized gamma distribution, whereas the restricted log-likelihood value corresponds to
constraining the shape parameter ς either to zero or to one, so that the generalized gamma
distribution reduces to the lognormal or Weibull distributions, respectively.
log-likelihood
distribution
unrestricted restricted
LR statistic p-value
lognormal (ς = 0) -5,929.35 -5,950.79 42.88 0.0000
Weibull (ς = 1) -5,929.35 -5,929.39 0.08 0.7831
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Table 7
Partial rank estimates of the semiparametric time-to-promotion model
We estimate a model for time to promotion in which the link function is strictly monotonic, but otherwise
unknown. We consider two samples. The first excludes individuals that begin at the firm either as managers or
directors (i.e., with zero duration), whereas the second includes these individuals and hence does not allow one
to control for the starting occupation. The partial rank estimator identifies the regression coefficients only up to
scale and so we fix the coefficient for exports to one. We obtain the pointwise estimates by means of a genetic
algorithm, whereas we employ subsampling to compute the standard errors that we report within parentheses.
no zero durations
covariate
with occupation without occupation
with zero durations
male −1.6872
(0.2367)
−1.5774
(0.4310)
−0.4835
(0.0523)
male×multinational 0.4035
(0.1850)
0.4576
(0.7971)
0.4838
(0.0640)
multinational −1.4063
(0.2079)
−1.6530
(0.8481)
−0.5463
(0.0411)
age −0.0598
(0.0045)
−0.0937
(0.0212)
−0.1486
(0.0297)
ln(size) 0.1305
(0.0686)
0.1241
(0.1102)
0.0911
(0.0316)
exports 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
university ratio −5.2572
(0.6845)
−6.6980
(1.0881)
−3.5195
(0.4713)
turnover −0.3169
(0.2834)
−0.5950
(0.3894)
−0.1406
(0.0488)
mean wage 0.0005
(0.0000)
0.0007
(0.0001)
0.0005
(0.0000)
modern 2.0510
(0.1506)
2.2914
(0.3475)
0.4490
(0.0866)
engineer 0.6561
(0.9823)
intermediate manager −1.2572
(1.4152)
supervisor −0.1089
(5.1821)
sample size 19,751 19,751 27,289
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Table 8
Wald tests for linear restrictions in the semiparametric model coefficients
We report partial rank estimates for the sum of coefficients with their subsampling-based standard errors
within parenthesis and with their p-values within brackets. The first tests whether there is gender differences
in time to promotion within multinational firms, whereas The second panel examines whether it takes less
time for men to get a promotion in multinationals as compared to domestic firms.
no zero durations
with occupation without occupation
with zero durations
H0: male + male×multinational = 0
partial rank estimate -1.2837 -1.1198 0.0003
standard error (0.2858) (1.1530) (0.0831)
p-value [0.0000] [0.3315] [0.9966]
H0: multinational + male×multinational = 0
partial rank estimate -1.0028 -1.1954 -0.0624
standard error (0.1737) (0.2682) (0.0359)
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0817]
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Table 9
Wage regressions with individual effects for both female and male workers
The dependent variable is the logarithm of real monthly wages. The dummy variable promotion takes value
one for every period after a promotion and zero otherwise, whereas tenure corresponds to the number of
years the individual has worked for the firm. We report both random- and fixed-effects estimates with their
robust standard errors within parentheses for both female and male wage regressions as well as the p-values
of the Wald test for the equality some (linear combinations of) coefficients in both regressions.
random effects fixed effects
covariate
female male female male
promotion 0.2569
(0.0312)
0.1874
(0.0105)
0.1937
(0.0387)
0.1304
(0.0124)
multinational×promotion −0.0996
(0.0418)
−0.0358
(0.0141)
−0.0984
(0.0520)
−0.0282
(0.0168)
multinational 0.0700
(0.0240)
0.0770
(0.0096)
lnsize 0.0412
(0.0123)
−0.0039
(0.0052)
exports 0.3079
(0.0803)
0.3746
(0.0243)
university ratio −0.6454
(0.1408)
−0.6342
(0.0559)
turnover 0.0606
(0.0487)
0.1168
(0.0201)
mean wage 0.0003
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0000)
modern 0.0742
(0.0247)
0.0613
(0.0097)
engineer 0.0550
(0.0257)
−0.0101
(0.0120)
intermediate manager 0.1084
(0.0280)
0.1477
(0.0140)
supervisor −0.1100
(0.0304)
−0.0640
(0.0152)
tenure 0.1324
(0.0041)
0.1217
(0.0016)
0.1309
(0.0047)
0.1210
(0.0017)
tenure2 −0.0059
(0.0003)
−0.0051
(0.0001)
−0.0057
(0.0004)
−0.0050
(0.0001)
constant 7.0700
(0.1039)
7.7659
(0.0454)
8.0128
(0.0111)
8.3169
(0.0043)
Wald test for equality of coefficients
promotion 0.0348 0.1190
promotion + multinational×promotion 0.8487 0.8585
number of observations 10,343 67,125 10,343 67,125
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Table 10
Logit regressions for the probability of promotion
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the individual obtains a promotion
to a managerial position, or else it equals zero. We report both random- and fixed-effects
estimates with their robust standard errors within parentheses as well as the p-values of the
Wald test for whether the sum of coefficients is equal to zero.
covariate (1) (2) (3)
male 0.6029
(0.1184)
0.6238
(0.1191)
0.6297
(0.1195)
male×multinational −0.1409
(0.1727)
−0.1596
(0.1733)
−0.1628
(0.1737)
multinational 0.7145
(0.1657)
0.7119
(0.1662)
0.6912
(0.1669)
lnsize 0.0179
(0.0322)
0.0251
(0.0320)
0.0086
(0.0323)
exports −0.2507
(0.1801)
−0.2634
(0.1765)
−0.3758
(0.1773)
university ratio 1.6929
(0.3106)
1.6144
(0.3098)
1.4631
(0.3173)
turnover −0.0918
(0.1249)
−0.1408
(0.1264)
−0.0732
(0.1251)
mean wage −0.0002
(0.0000)
−0.0002
(0.0000)
−0.0002
(0.0000)
modern −0.5037
(0.0649)
−0.4875
(0.0655)
−0.5049
(0.0656)
engineer 0.1017
(0.0798)
0.0609
(0.0801)
intermediate manager 0.4718
(0.0852)
0.4593
(0.0857)
supervisor 0.1030
(0.0945)
0.1143
(0.0948)
tenure 0.0203
(0.0022)
tenure2 −0.0001
(0.0000)
constant −2.9127
(0.2943)
−3.1655
(0.2988)
−3.5113
(0.3045)
Wald test for whether the sum of coefficients is equal to zero
male + male×multinational 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
multinational + male×multinational 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
log likelihood -5,523.80 -5,502.38 -5,450.79
number of observations 19,751 19,751 19,751
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Table 11
Top management and gender concerns
The dummy variable ∆
(ij)
F takes value one if the number of women in top man-
agement positions in firm j has increased from the year preceding the promo-
tion of individual i; zero otherwise. ∆
(ij)
M is the analogous dummy variable for
male workers, assuming value one if the number of men in top management
positions in firm j has increased from the year preceding the promotion of
individual i; zero otherwise. We report the average values of ∆
(ij)
F and ∆
(ij)
M
by gender and firm ownership.
domestic multinational
∆
(ij)
F = 0 ∆
(ij)
F = 1 ∆
(ij)
F = 0 ∆
(ij)
F = 1
female ∆
(ij)
M = 0 0.5238 0.1667 0.4026 0.2078
∆
(ij)
M = 1 0.0595 0.2500 0.0519 0.3377
male ∆
(ij)
M = 0 0.5219 0.0558 0.4663 0.0660
∆
(ij)
M = 1 0.1753 0.2470 0.1348 0.3329
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